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Abstract 
Derivatives markets in Chile and Brazil play a large and growing role 
in their financial markets and overall economic activity. Of special 
importance is Chile’s over-the-counter market in foreign exchange 
derivatives which has become an established market with dealers, high 
liquidity and low bid-ask spreads. These derivatives markets have 
helped many firms lower their risks and lower their borrowing costs. 
At the same time, they pose new challenges to the stability of Chile’s 
economy. This report focuses on Chile, and to a lesser extent on Brazil, 
to provide an analytical description of the growth of derivatives 
markets and an economic analysis of their role in the economy. The 
first part includes a discussion of the various derivatives instruments, 
the different market participants and the manner in which prices are 
determined in these markets. Also included in this descriptive analysis 
is a discussion of Chile’s regulatory framework for derivatives and 
how they have shaped the growth and stability of the markets. The 
second part of the report includes an economic analysis of what 
derivatives markets mean for the cost and risk of foreign borrowing, 
the stability of international capital flows, pro-cyclical linkages to 
exchange rate movements, the use of derivatives in certain hedge fund 
investment strategies, and the potential risks to the stability of Chile’s 
financial markets. Using a unique data base of derivatives’ daily open 
position for Chile, provided by the Central Bank, we analyze their 
impact on the exchange rate during particular periods. It also includes 
a discussion of derivatives’ use in speculative flows between Chile and 
Brazil. 
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Introduction 
In order to properly introduce the subject of derivatives markets before 
commencing to analyze their role in the economy, this report will 
provide an extended description of these markets. Part I of the report 
then offers a brief comparison of derivatives markets in Brazil and 
Chile, followed by a detailed analytical description of Chile’s 
derivatives markets and how they operate. 
The analytical description in Part I explain the importance of 
derivatives markets, the structure of those markets and how they 
operate. The structure of the markets includes the role of derivatives 
dealers, brokers, end-users or customers and any bilateral or 
multilateral trading facilities. End-users can be hedgers or speculators, 
and these include pension funds,1 exporters, importers, hedge funds 
and unknown others. Part I will also briefly describe the role of 
regulation in these markets. All together it is hoped that the picture 
painted in Part I will prove useful to policy makers, the media and 
scholars to better understand the changing character of Chile’s 
financial markets. 
Part II will provide a policy analysis of various issues raised by 
the growing role of derivatives markets in the Chilean economy. This 
will include an analysis of their interaction with exchange rate 
fluctuations, response to external shocks, whether or not their impact is 
cyclical, how they deal with capital surges and droughts, and how they 
serve as conduit for certain hedge fund investment strategies. 
                                                     
1   The term pension funds is used throughout the paper to refer to "fondos de pensiones" which are privately owned retirement funds 
that are different from the private, employer provided pension funds in the US.  
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As often is the case, there is a caveat. Some derivatives markets are non-transparent, and 
Chile’s over-the-counter derivatives market suffers from this fate. It is therefore not possible to 
make assurances that the picture is 100% complete. This work does nonetheless reflect a great deal 
of information collected from a wide array of sources. This includes very valuable data from Chile’s 
Central Bank, its bank superintendent authority, its pension fund regulatory agency and the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS).2 It also includes many hours of interviews with senior 
representatives from foreign banks, local Chilean banks, ‘investment companies’, pension fund 
managers, independent financial consultants, bank regulators, central bank staff and managers, and 
pension fund regulators. 
 
                                                     
2   Banco Central de Chile or BCCH, Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras or SBIF, and Superintendencia de 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones or SAFP. 
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Part I 
1. The importance of derivatives markets 
Derivatives markets serve two important economic purposes: risk 
shifting and price discovery. Risk shifting —more commonly called 
hedging— is the transfer of risk from one entity who does not want it 
to another entity that is more willing or able to bear it. Derivatives 
trading can help determine or ‘discover’ the price of certain assets, 
commodities or types of risk that would not otherwise occur because of 
transactions costs, dispersion of markets for the underlying item or the 
conglomeration of many risks into one whole asset. One of the most 
important price discovery functions is the determination of the price of 
the underlying item, e.g. an exchange rate, over time. Derivatives 
markets can serve to determine not just spot prices but also future 
prices (and in the case of options the price of the risk is determined). 
Risk shifting is important for a variety of economic agents. 
Importers and exporters hedge their foreign exchange exposure so that 
their importing costs and exporting revenues became less volatile. 
Firms borrowing in foreign markets hedge the local currency value of 
their hard currency debt payments. Of special importance for the case 
of Chile are the pension funds who invest a substantial share of their 
assets abroad and then hedge the value of these foreign currency assets 
back into pesos. Lastly, there are hedge funds and other entities that 
might use derivatives markets for investment strategies such as 
profiting from the large interest rate differential between Chile  
and Brazil. 
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One of the implications of efficient risk shifting is the ability to raise capital more cheaply in 
capital markets. The development of Chile’s cross-currency swaps market has enabled some large 
corporations and banks to lower their cost of borrowing without increasing their exchange rate risk. 
They borrow abroad in hard currency at interest rates lower than in Chile, and then use derivatives 
to shift out of foreign currency exposure and back into peso liabilities at an effective peso interest 
rate that is lower than borrowing directly in the Chilean capital market.  
Table 1 shows the outstanding amounts of derivatives at year end 2005 and the trading 
volume for the year 2005. 
Table 1 
SIZE OF CHILE'S DERIVATIVES MARKETS, 2005 
(billions of US$) 
 Outstanding Amount Trading Volume 
Commodities 15.9 18.4 
Copper 15.8 18.0 
Interest Rate 11.0 5.9 
Fixed rate 6.7  
Foreign Exchange 24.4 382.8 
Local  254.3 
External  128.4 
Total amounts 51.3 407.1 
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
 
The efficiency of derivatives markets in discovering prices and providing risk shifting 
functions is linked to their liquidity and trading volume. For this reason size matters, and the size of 
Chile’s derivatives markets is large and growing rapidly. Annual trading volume in foreign 
exchange derivatives —the largest segment of Chile’s derivatives markets— increased from $113 
billion in 1998 to $383 billion in 2005. That amounts to a 240% increase, and the trading volume 
for the last quarter of 2005 was at an annual rate of $419 billion which amounts to a 31% rate of 
growth from the last quarter of 2004. 
Central Bank data shows that daily trading volume in the foreign exchange derivatives 
market to be $1.7 billion in the formal market alone. This does not include the “informal market” 
and it does not include off-shore transactions or transactions between residents who are not 
registered as part of the formal market because they are not subject to the reporting requirement of 
the formal market. 
Chile’s interest rate derivatives market, in relation to the size of the capital market, is also 
large and growing. Outstanding amounts of interest rate derivatives grew from $4.7 billion at  
the end of 1998 to $11 billion for 2005. That represents a 136% increase over the seven year period 
—although most of the increase came in the first few years.  
Commodity derivatives grew at a comparably much faster rate. The vast majority of 
commodity derivatives are based on copper although the data also shows some trading in 
derivatives on gold and silver. The outstanding amount of these derivatives grew from $2.38 billion 
in 1998 to $15.9 billion in 2005 —a 569% increase. Most of this growth occurred in just the last 
three years as outstanding amounts ranged between $2 billion to $4 billion until 2002. 
As a point in comparison to the large presence of derivatives in the Chilean economy, the 
following table 2 illustrates how the outstanding amounts and trading volume compare to other key 
financial and economic stocks and flows. 
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Table 2 
COMPARISON FIGURES FOR CHILE, 2005 
(billions of US$) 
FINANCIAL STOCKS  








Money stock (M2) 
International reserves 
Market capitalization (2004) 
Total foreign debt 
Net stock of foreign investment 
Gross stock of foreign investment 81.8 








Net direct investment flows 
Net portfolio flows -2.9 
Source: Central Bank of Chile and International Financial Statistics. 
2. Comparison of Chilean and Brazilian derivatives markets 
In order to help put the descriptive analysis of Chile’s derivatives markets in some context, it is 
useful to compare it with that of Brazil. 
The first and most apparent difference between the two countries’ derivatives markets is the 
development of Brazil’s derivatives exchanges.  
Derivatives trading in Brazil can be traced back to 1917 when derivatives on agricultural 
products —mostly coffee and cotton— were traded on the Bolsa de Mercadoria de São Paulo 
(BMSP). A greater variety of agricultural futures were added starting in the 1970s, and the  
1980s witnessed a tremendous period of growth and innovation with the introduction of new 
derivatives contracts.  
Innovation was not limited to agricultural derivatives, but with the introduction of new 
derivatives exchanges came the introduction of futures and options on financial instruments. In 
1979, Brazil’s two stock exchanges (both the BOVESPA and BVRJ) started trading futures and 
options on individual stocks. The BMSP then added futures on gold to their agricultural futures in 
1980. The Brazilian Futures Exchange (Bolsa Brasileira de Futuros-BBF) was created in 1983 and 
offered trading in futures and options on stocks and stock indexes. Next in 1986, the Bolsa de 
Mercadorias e de Futuros (BM&F) was created to trade forwards and futures on gold and futures on 
stock indexes.  
Thus by the end of the 1980s there was direct competition between three derivatives 
exchanges that were trading similar products —competition in a business where there is a natural 
monopoly because trading volume gravitates to liquidity which adds to the most liquid market and 
drains it from less liquid markets.3 By 1997 the three exchanges had merged to form a single futures 
exchange with the old initials of BM&F but with a new national name of Brazilian Mercantile and 
Futures Exchange. Also following this economic logic, the stock exchange in Rio (BVRL) merged 
                                                     
3  Trading operations such as bucket-shops and electronic communication networks (ECNs in the US) sometimes continue to exist 
because they ‘steal or borrow’ the price discovery that occurs on the liquid exchange. 
ECLAC - Project Documents collection  Report on derivatives markets: stabilizing or speculative impact on Chile... 
12 
into the BOVESPA in São Paulo to form a single national stock exchange (which also trades some 
derivatives instruments).4 These two exchanges are now amongst the largest derivatives exchanges 
in the world. 
Table 3 
BOLSA DE MERCADORIAS & FUTUROS 
 
DERIVATIVES PRODUCTS TRADED ON THE BM&F  
Agricultural: forwards, futures and options   
         Live cattle 
         Feeder cattle 
         Sugar 
         Coffee, Arabica and Robusta-Conillon 
         Ethanol 
         Soy beans 
         Corn 
Gold: forwards, futures and options   
Stocks and Stock Indexes, including Brazil 50 index and IBOVESPA 
         forwards, futures and options 
Interest Rates: forwards, futures and options   
         External debt of Brazil 
         Inter-bank deposit rate 
         Inflation rate 
Foreign Exchange: forwards, futures and options  
         US dollar, EURO and US dollar volatility 
Carbon Emission Credits    
Source: BM&F Clearing House. 
 
Further market development involves the role of BM&F as a national clearing house for 
currency, bonds, other assets, commodities and carbon emission credits. It also offers a range of 
types of derivatives contracts that include forward, futures, options, flex options and swaps. It 
recently opened an electronic trading platform that allows small market participants to trade on the 
exchange by offering them smaller sized contracts called ‘minis’. Today the vast majority of 
derivatives contracts traded on the BM&F are on interest rate products while those on exchange 
rates are a distant second.  
In addition to this development of its exchange traded derivatives markets, Brazil also has 
developed a robust over-the-counter (OTC) market. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
offers scant data on derivatives markets in developing countries, and those in Brazil and Chile are 
no exception. Based on available data, the BIS reports that daily trading volume in foreign 
exchange derivatives is roughly the same in Brazil as in Chile —$1 billion per day.5 On the other 
hand, the BIS reports that Brazil also has roughly $1 billion per day in OTC trading in single-
currency interest rate derivatives.  
In comparison to the $2 billion a day in average daily trading volume on OTC markets in 
Brazil, the BM&F clearing house reported that on a recent day there was $31 billion in trading 
volume on the exchange.  
                                                     
4   The authors are indebted with Carlos Mussi for his historical account and analysis of Brazil’s derivatives exchanges.  
5   Note that figure is in contradiction to currency data from the Central Bank of Chile. 
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The US Futures Industry Association’s most recent global survey of derivatives exchanges 
shows that Brazil’s BOVESPA and BM&F rank as the 8th and 10th largest in the world when 
measured by the number of derivatives contracts traded. BM&F’s futures contract on the overnight 
inter-bank loan rate was ranked tenth in the world based on the number of contracts traded.6 
One of the key distinctions between the exchange traded derivatives and the OTC market is 
that the exchanges have a clearing house. Clearing houses serve several very important functions. 
First they raise the credit quality of trading throughout the entire market. Raising the credit quality 
or trading counterparties serves both to improve the systemic stability of the market and allows 
small market participants to trade with the major financial institutions because they all must trade 
with collateral (also known as margin) instead of relying on capital. Secondly, the clearing house 
facilitates the post-trading process. This first involves trade confirmation, then position netting, then 
the efficient management of collateral (margin) and lastly the settlement of payments and deliveries. 
The recent scandal of the credit derivatives market in New York involving long delays in the 
confirmation and clearing of credit derivatives trades is in sharp contrast to the functioning of a 
clearing house which settles daily and payments are made promptly —in the Brazilian case on a 
T+1 basis through the central bank. 
Brazil’s BM&F exchange’s clearing house also serves to register OTC derivatives. This is 
critical for establishing the legal certainty of the trades as well as creating detailed market 
information that can improve transparency and be used by authorities for market surveillance. 
Sometimes the clearing house acts as a guarantor of the OTC contracts, and sometimes it acts only 
to register them. 
Thus Brazil’s derivatives markets are comprised of both exchange traded and OTC traded 
derivatives, while Chile’s market is comprised entirely of OTC markets. 
3. Derivatives instruments 
A good general definition of a derivative is the following. 
A derivative is a financial contract whose value is derived from an underlying asset or 
commodity price, an index, rate or event. They commonly go by names such as forward, future, 
option, and swap, and they are often embedded in hybrid or structured securities. 
The main types of derivatives include forwards, futures, options and swaps. They can be 
combined with one another, such as swaptions or options on futures, and they can be combined with 
securities to form ‘hybrid’ instruments or structured securities. Futures and options are traded on 
exchanges where a centralized trading floor or platform allows for everyone in the market to trade 
on a multilateral basis. It is considered multilateral because everyone can see everyone else’s quotes 
and execution prices. Derivatives exchanges are usually regulated and have a clearing house.  
In contrast to exchange trading, forwards, swaps and options are traded over-the-counter 
(OTC) in bilateral derivatives markets where one or more dealers serve as market makers. These 
markets do not have a central trading floor or platform, and they are often unregulated. All of 
Chile’s derivatives markets are organized as OTC markets and the foreign exchange derivatives 
markets are subject to some degree of regulation for its role in the formal foreign exchange market. 
The forward contract is the most basic of derivatives contracts. Its use dates back to the third 
millennium B.C. in Mesopotamia, and it is currently the predominant contract used today in Chile’s 
OTC derivatives markets (see Swan, 2000). 
                                                     
6   Futures Industry Association, survey for January-February 2006. 
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By far the most prominent derivatives instrument traded in Chile’s derivatives markets is the 
forward contract on foreign exchange. A forward is the obligation to buy (or sell) a specified 
quantity of a specified item at a specified price or rate at a specified time in the future. Consider the 
following example. Firm X enters a forward contract with firm Y on January 1 to sell Chilean pesos 
(CHP) forward for US$1 million (or in other words buys dollars with pesos) at 600 pesos per dollar 
($0.001667) for delivery on April 1. On the settlement day, firm X will transfer CHP600 million to 
counterparty Y and will receive in return $1 million. The transaction will represent a gain for firm X 
if the spot exchange rate at the time of settlement, the price of pesos expressed in US$, is lower than 
the contracted price of $0.001667. A higher spot price or exchange rate would represent a loss for 
firm X. A forward contract does not necessarily require any transfer of funds, currency or collateral 
between the counterparties at the origination of the transaction. Counterparties can arrange for 
collateral to be used to assure that the other side perform on the contract. In the above example, no 
transfers occurred until the April 1st date. 
Making delivery, or receiving the delivery, of foreign currency as part of foreign exchange 
forward trading is sometimes unnecessary, expensive, inconvenient or subject to taxation or capital 
controls. In order to avoid the unwanted transactions costs, derivatives market participants 
sometimes trade foreign exchange forwards that are “cash settled” in one currency. These are 
known as non-deliverable forwards (NDF). The NDF market in Chilean peso-US dollars has 
developed in off-shore markets —mainly in New York and London. An NDF performs the same 
risk shifting functions as a normal forward contract, but it is settled by a single payment in  
US$ that is equal to the US$ value of the difference between the forward rate and the spot exchange 
rate on the terminal date of the contract. It functions like a conventional forward contract, but 
instead of paying pesos for dollars, the losing side pays to the winner the dollar amount of the gain 
on the contract. 
Consider the following example. Firm X enters a 90-day NDF to sell CHP forward for US$ 1 
million at $0.001667 in order to hedge a future payment on foreign debt or for imported 
merchandise. The contract is settled on the 90th day, and the spot exchange rate turns out to be 
$0.001515 (or 660 pesos to a dollar). The price of pesos has fallen by $0.000152, and so firm X  
—the short seller of pesos— will receive gains on the NDF. The amount will be equal to 
US$90,900 or the savings of CHP 60 million valued at the new exchange rate of $0.001515. That 
gain is paid in US$ by the long side of the forward (the purchaser of pesos).   
The current daily trading volume in the NDF market in Chilean pesos is estimated to be $0.4 
billion. There are no reporting requirements for this portion of Chile’s derivatives market —if one 
can refer to it as Chile’s since it is off-shore— and so these figures are only estimates. The NDF 
market interacts closely with the deliverable forward market in Chile. When dealers in the NDF 
market lay-off their exposures with transactions in Chile’s “formal” foreign exchange market then 
that transaction is subject to reporting requirements and will then be included in official figures. 
Another important type of derivative instrument in the Chilean market is the cross-currency 
swaps (CCS). It is also known as a foreign currency swap and is distinct from the foreign exchange 
swap. CCS are designed to exchange a stream of payments in one currency for a series of payments 
in another currency. The stream of payments is generally chosen to match that of a bond or loan. In 
that case the CCS is an exchange of interest rate and principal payments equivalent to a fair trade of 
a dollar bond for a peso (or UF) denominated bond of the same maturity. It amounts to a fair trade 
of a US$ bond with a coupon rate of x% for a Chilean U.F. bond with a coupon rate of y%. The 
interest rate payments may be based either on fixed or floating interest rates. 
A typical example of a 10-year CCS exchanges fixed Chilean U.F. peso payments for 
variable US dollar payments. The dollar payments are typically equal to LIBOR plus a spread, the 
U.F. peso payments are usually at a fixed rate, and there is a final exchange of pesos for dollars 
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reflecting the principal payments. The CCS against US dollar LIBOR is “priced” by choosing the 
fixed peso rate and the “spread” so that the present value of the contract is zero. 
In Chile, the most likely use of CCS by hedgers is to swap floating rate US$ debt obligations, 
e.g. those linked to a floating rate such as LIBOR, into a fixed peso or UF rate. Interviews with 
representatives from several large corporations in Chile indicate that the CCS has low spreads and 
tenors (maturities) of up to 12 years. This allows the market risk on long-term LIBOR debt to be 
shifted into fixed rate peso obligations. 
Options are another part of the Chile’s OTC derivatives market. An option contract gives the 
buyer or holder of the option (known as the long options position) the right to buy (sell) the 
underlying item at a specific price over a specific time period in the future. In the case of a call 
option, the holder has the right to buy the underlying currency at a specified exchange rate  
—known as the strike or exercise price— at a specified time in the future. If the spot market price 
of the currency were to rise above the strike, then the holder would be able to exercise the option 
and buy at the lower strike price. The value of exercising the call option would be the difference 
between the higher market price and the lower strike price. If the market price were to remain below 
the strike price during the period when the call option was exercisable, then the “out of the money” 
option would not be worth exercising and it would expire worthless. 
In the case of a put option, the option holder has the right to sell the underlying item at a 
specified price at a specified time in the future. A put option on foreign currency allows the holder to 
sell at the exercise price, and thereby to profit if the market price falls. A put option acts as a form of 
price insurance that guarantees a floor or minimum price. Like an insurance policy, the price paid for the 
option is called a premium. Keep in mind that an exchange rate is the relative price of two currencies, 
and so a put on one currency is a call on the other. 
Whereas the holder of the option has the right to exercise the option in order to buy or sell at the 
more favorable strike price, the writer or seller of the option (known as the short options position) has 
the obligation to fulfill the contract if it is exercised by the option buyer. The writer of an option is thus 
exposed to potentially large losses. The writer of a call option is exposed to losses from the market price 
rising above the strike price, and the writer of a put option is exposed to losses if the price of the 
underlying item were to fall below that of the exercise price.  
Consider the following example. An importer buys a put option on the Chilean peso against 
the dollar with an exercise (strike) exchange rate of 600 pesos to the dollar ($0.001667 per peso). 
The notional principal is $1,000,000, it is exercisable over a 6 month period, and the premium is 5% 
of the notional principal (i.e. $50,000). If the peso depreciates to 660 to the dollar ($0.001515 per 
peso), then the put can be exercised for a gain by selling the pesos (buying dollars) at $0.001667 
instead of the lower spot rate. 
There is a large variety of different types of options, although it is not certain which are being 
traded in Chile. There are path-dependent options such as barrier options (especially knock-in and 
knock-out options) and “Asian” options which can be exercised at the average price or the 
minimum (maximum) price during the exercise period. There are also options on swaps called 
swaptions which allow the options holder the right to enter into an interest rate swap at a specified 
fixed rate.7 
Due to the non-transparent nature of OTC derivatives, it is not possible to determine exactly 
which varieties of options or other derivatives are being traded in Chile’s derivatives markets. There 
is evidence from Central Bank data that there are single currency interest rate swaps and forward 
rate agreements and there are commodity based derivatives —especially on copper prices.  
                                                     
7  Additional information about derivatives instruments can be found at “Primers” at www.financialpolicy.org. 
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Interviews with representatives from several major corporations revealed that they sometimes 
prefer to use options as a means to hedge when they are especially uncertain about the direction of 
change in the exchange rate. This is relevant in situations where the peso has experienced an 
extended period of appreciation but the continuation of that trend is unlikely. Whereas derivatives 
such as forwards or CCS would lock in the value of the peso for a specific period into the future, an 
option position would enable a hedger to protect against a fall in the peso’s value while at the same 
time avoiding the loss of benefits from an appreciation in its value. 
The options market in Chile is substantial and growing rapidly. Its growth has been delayed 
because of restriction on the offering of options by banks and restrictions on their use by pension 
funds. These restrictions arose from prudential concerns that led to a gradual introduction of options 
into the Chilean market. Previously, the extent of options trading in Chile’s markets was limited to 
the efforts of off-shore dealers and on-shore but unregulated bank affiliates called “investment 
companies.” Recent changes in banking regulations (September 2005) will allow banks registered in 
Chile to begin offering options once they have demonstrated their adoption and implementation of 
value-at risk (VAR) models. Reportedly, it was the introduction of risk models by banks that will 
then be validated by the bank regulator (in preparation for the implementation of Basle II Capital 
Accord), as well as the existence in practice of options, that encouraged the bank regulator to allow 
formal introduction of options, for banks which they consider have a proper assessment of risk. 
Initially, reportedly it has only been Banco Santander that has developed this type of model and was 
authorized to develop options in the formal market. This has restricted the growth of this formal 
market. Although they can be expensive in comparison to forwards and swaps, options fill a useful 
role in risk management. 
4. Structure of the derivatives market 
Chile’s derivatives markets are organized as “over-the-counter” markets. OTC markets are 
organized around a set of dealers who form the core of the market by posting bid and ask quotes 
and by taking the opposing side to every trade. Dealers are thus known as ‘market makers.’ The 
market is also comprised of customers or end-users who trade derivatives in order to hedge or 
speculate. Some OTC derivatives markets have brokers who improve the flow of information in the 
market. These brokers are most likely to work in the inter-dealer market where dealers trade 
exclusively with one another. In some cases they also help end-users to find the best prices 
available from dealers and other end-users in the market. 
The end-users are the final customers in the derivatives marketplace. They trade in order to 
hedge some existing risk, to adjust their hedge due to a change in the market or to speculate. End-
users include smaller and medium sized banks that unlike the larger banks do not act as derivatives 
dealers. Pension fund managers and other institutional asset managers are end-users; they employ 
derivatives to manage the risk on their portfolios. End-users also include non-financial corporations 
who use derivatives to hedge their market risk as well as to structure their financing so as to lower 
borrowing costs. Non-financial corporations might face the risk of exchange rate volatility if they 
are importers or exporters, and they might face commodity price volatility if they are producers or 
heavy users of commodities. End-users also include hedge funds who use derivatives as part of their 
investment strategies. 
OTC derivatives markets are organized differently than exchanges. The OTC markets have 
traditionally been organized around one or more dealers who “make a market” by maintaining bid 
and offer quotes to market participants. The OTC market is usually bifurcated between an inter-
dealer market where dealers trade exclusively with one another and a customer market where end-
users trade with one or more of the available dealers. In the inter-dealer market, dealers maintain 
price quotes to each other and allow a dealer to quickly lay-off the risk of buying or selling to a 
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customer. This market is the more liquid of the two, and the bid-ask spread is smaller than that 
offered by dealers to their customers. The difference in bid-ask spreads is a key way in which 
dealers consistently make money through trading volume.  
Trading in OTC markets is bilateral in that price quotes and trades are made principle to 
principle and are not observed by others in the market. In some cases, brokers play a role in 
providing marketwise information. In some of Chile’s derivatives markets there are brokers 
working in the inter-dealer portion of the market to provide multilateral information on price quotes 
and execution prices. Brokers often provide electronic bulletin boards, managed by brokerage firms, 
to provide their clients (i.e. the dealers) with the ability to instantaneously post quotes to every 
dealer in the broker’s net work. Presently these screens show bids, asks and execution prices on 
forward foreign exchange contracts, cross-currency swaps and interest rates swaps. The broker 
screens are generally not available to non-dealers and so end-users are usually unaware of changes 
in prices and the bid-ask spread in the inter-dealer market. 
Dealers cannot trade through the screen or over the electronic system. Instead the screen is 
just for relaying information, and the dealer must trade through the broker or call other dealers 
directly over the phone in order to execute a trade. (Note that some dealers also use an instant 
messaging arrangement in order to ask for quotes and even accept the quotes.) Dealers can also use 
direct telephone calls to the broker and other dealers to post quotes and inquire about quotes that are 
not listed on the brokers’ electronic bulletin board screens.  
Although it is not currently operating for derivatives transactions, there are two electronic 
trading platforms in Chile that allow dealers to post quotes and to execute trades in the spot foreign 
exchange market. These electronic platforms in the spot market handle a large quantity of small and 
sometimes large transactions and replicate the experience of an exchange —except that it is not 
open to everyone. 
The second portion of the OTC market is comprised of the bilateral trading between dealers 
and end-users. This market is voice negotiated although dealers might offer their customers some 
proprietary electronic conveyance for observing their quotes and submitting buy and sell orders 
electronically. These dealers provided electronic screens are thus bilateral. If a customer wants to 
get a more complete view of the market they will need to contact several dealers in order to observe 
the range of market prices. 
Although electronic bulletin boards and dealers’ trading facilities have recently made 
substantial changes to the trading process in OTC markets, it is not truly multilateral until 
participation is extended to everyone in the market. Derivatives exchanges and stock exchanges are 
fully multilateral and this allows everyone buying and selling in the marketplace to observe the 
same quotes and trade at the same prices. Trading between dealers and customers remains a bilateral 
market because only one party is posting quotes and only the dealer and the customer know the 
price at which the trade actually occurs.  
However, it should be pointed out that the bilateral negotiation process that occurs in OTC 
derivatives markets is often automated. Dealers have direct phone lines to other dealers as well as to 
their major customers. This enables them to have near-instantaneous communication. A market 
participant can call up a dealer, ask for quotes, hang up and then repeat with another dealer in a 
matter of a few seconds. This amounts to a quick survey of several dealers in just a few seconds in 
order to determine the prevailing price quotes in the market. A quick series of such calls can give a 
dealer or an active investor a view of the market that is close but not exactly the same that in a 
multilateral market. After all, a quick survey of market quotes is not as useful as seeing the prices at 
which all other trades are being executed. Also, clearing is conducted bilaterally in OTC markets. 
Even if trades are brokered, the counterparties must ultimately confirm and settle trades on a 
bilateral principle to principle basis. 
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(a) Derivatives dealers 
There are reported to be 15 or 16 dealers in Chile’s derivatives markets. A dealer is defined in 
economic terms as a market participant who is actively making price quotes, and is executing buys 
and sells at the quoted prices. Designation as a dealer is also a regulatory matter. Chile’s regulations 
governing the use of derivatives by pension funds limits who is an eligible derivatives counterparty 
for their private pension fund managers, and this for the most part designates who are the dealers in 
Chile’s market. In addition, Chile’s banking regulation also puts some limitations on the ability of 
banks to act as dealers. At present, banks are required to demonstrate the adaptation of internal risk 
management models prior to their being allowed to act as options dealers.  
While there are possibly 16 dealers in Chile’s derivatives markets, not every dealer is the 
same size or acts as a dealer in every type of derivative product. Major dealers, of which there are 
five, include Santander Santiago, JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, Deutsche Bank and Banco de Chile. 
Thus four of the five major market players are foreign owned subsidiaries, although they are 
regulated by the Chilean authorities.  
Chile’s markets are also comprised of unregulated “finance companies” (Sociedades 
Financieras) that are affiliates of the foreign-owned banks. These finance companies trade and often 
operate as dealers in Chilean derivatives markets. (This has been especially the case for options 
trading —which until recently was forbidden for Chilean banks— and for other derivatives 
transactions that might involve high capital requirements for the regulated affiliate). Local Chilean 
owned banks that serve as derivatives dealers, such as Banco de Chile, do not operate a ‘finance 
company.’ 
There are also derivatives dealers in external markets such as those in New York and London. 
These dealers often trade in NDF contracts in order to facilitating trading without having to 
regularly clear payments through Chile’s banking system. 
(b) Brokers in derivatives markets 
The role of the brokers in OTC derivatives market is to consolidate information and to allow 
the major participants to trade with anonymity. Dealers often want to conceal their investments 
strategies and are concerned that the strategy will be revealed when they conduct large sales or 
purchases in the market. For instance, they might be concerned that the market will move away 
from them as they try to execute large volumes of transactions. By trading through a broker, a 
dealer can maintain their anonymity and benefit from a centralization of market information by 
posting their quotes and hitting other dealers’ quotes through the broker. 
Chile’s inter-dealer derivatives market has three brokers. These are Tullett Prebon, GFI and 
Lopez-Leon. GFI also claims to broker NDF on Chilean pesos and other Latin American currencies 
(www.gfigroup.com). Lopez-Leon, with a location in Santiago, claims to broker swaps, foreign 
exchange forwards and swaps, and interest rate swaps (www.lopezleon.com). 
 
(c) Customers or end-users in derivatives markets 
Customers, who are also known as end-users, are those trading derivatives for the purpose of 
hedging, or speculating, but not with the expectation of immediately reversing the transaction to 
capture the bid-ask spread in the market. They are not market makers, even though some active 
participants such as pension funds and hedge funds provide a great deal of liquidity to the markets. 
Pension funds are the largest and the most important customers in the market. Not only are 
they important for the mere size of their derivatives transactions volume, but also for their critical 
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role as the largest long-peso hedgers in the markets. They generate a great deal of trading volume as 
they role over their short-term foreign exchange forward positions, and this provides an enormous 
amount of liquidity in the market. In regards to their role of long-hedgers, developing countries are 
generally faced with more short-hedgers than long-hedgers in their foreign exchange markets. This 
arises from hard currency denominated foreign debt and sometimes from importers hedging more 
than exporters. Moreover, the general expectation in the market, which is that the local currency 
will depreciate against the US dollar or other major currencies, does not promote long-hedging. 
More recently, the experience of the Chilean and Brazilian currencies appreciating against the US 
dollar may function to correct this. 
Long-hedgers are critical for ‘completing’ derivatives markets, and Chile’s financial 
regulations requiring their privately managed pension funds to hedge their foreign investments back 
into Chilean pesos has made a major contribution to the development of deep foreign exchange 
derivatives markets in Chile. More specifically, the regulation requires pension funds to hedge a 
minimum portion of the foreign exchange exposure arising from the foreign investments in their 
portfolio. The exposure ceiling is measured as a percentage of the present value of the foreign 
assets, (the amount of foreign assets varies for each different type of fund). In practice, Chile’s 
private pension funds have in fact hedged more than that required by regulation. One reason for this 
comes from their incentive to report less volatile returns to pension fund investors (and they are 
required by regulation to regularly report their returns).  
Without pension funds’ participation in the markets, it would be very difficult for derivatives 
dealers to manage the risk arising from market making because most other hedgers in the Chilean 
markets are likely to want to short-hedge the peso. And even hedge fund investment strategies 
(described below in Part II) begin by short-selling the Chilean peso. 
One pension fund manager we interviewed said that the firm conducted about $40 to $50 
million of foreign exchange forward transactions a day. Central Bank data shows that during the 
second half of 2005 monthly sales of peso-dollar forwards by pension funds reached US$2,000 
million, with a net forward outstanding position of pension funds reaching US$12,000 million by 
December 2005. Most of these transactions were conducted in the short-term maturity portion of the 
forward market, and in particular they were concentrated in the 30 to 60 day range of maturities. 
Although the market offers good prices in one-year maturities, the market is reportedly lacking in 
sufficient depth to allow pension funds to roll-over their large positions without moving market 
prices away from them.8 The term “good prices” refers to the low bid-ask spread in the market. The 
bid-ask spread for 60 day forwards is not significantly different than that for one year. It does not 
refer to the steepness of the forward curve that defines the difference between spot, forward and 
distant future prices. As a result, pension funds find it cheaper to operate in the 30 to 60 day range 
of the forward market. 
Non-financial corporations, especially large corporations with strong credit ratings, use 
derivatives markets to hedge or as part of their financial strategy to lower borrowing costs by 
issuing debt in international markets. International credit markets are very deep even for long 
maturity debt issuances, and the nominal rates are usually much lower than those denominated in 
Chilean pesos. This allows firms to raise large amounts of funds with a single issue, and to borrow 
for longer maturities. Chilean firms often pay relatively small credit risk premiums (interest rate 
spreads) when they borrow at a variable rate in these credit markets. Borrowing internationally in 
US dollars or Euros does, however, result in foreign exchange exposure. In recent years, highly 
rated corporations have begun using cross-currency swaps to avoid this risk by swapping back into 
fixed rate peso or U.F. peso payments. The combination of low US dollar interest rates, low credit 
                                                     
8    The term ‘moving prices away from them’ means that the process of buying back pesos (from expiring contracts) and selling them 
forward tends to drive down the forward price if the market is not sufficiently deep.   
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spreads and the CCS rate allow the firm to effectively borrow in long-term fixed peso interest rates 
at a lower rate than would be possible in Chile’s domestic credit market.  
A related point that bears on the accuracy of the data and financial statements, these 
corporations sometimes hedge through their parents or affiliates and this is often conducted through 
off-shore markets. 
Another important use of derivatives is by large corporations that borrow abroad through 
foreign currency debt (usually US dollars) but have little or no foreign exchange revenue; they use 
derivatives markets to reduce their net foreign exchange exposure. 
The medium sized firms are unlikely to be able to borrow abroad and thus unlikely to have 
foreign currency denominated debt to hedge. Their participation in derivatives markets is most 
likely to hedge exchange rate exposure arising from their participation in or exposure to the import 
or export business. 
Small and medium enterprises involved with importing or exporting, however, could benefit 
greatly from hedging. This is particularly important for exporters who could become priced out of 
the market by a strong and possibly stronger value of the peso. The inability to hedge may 
discourage firms from investing for the purpose of exporting since profit rates could be quickly 
wiped out by a currency appreciation.9  
In interviews, bank regulators stated that less than 15% of small and medium term enterprises 
(SMEs) that export are estimated to use derivatives. Corroborating information comes from a study 
by Cowan, Micco and Yáñez (2006) of SMEs in manufacturing in 2004. It showed practically no 
use of derivatives by SMEs for hedging. According to this study, derivatives are only used 
intensively by a limited number of large firms. This is a source of growing concern in certain 
circles, and business institutions like the Banco Estado, SOFOFA and the Association of Banks are 
disseminating information about derivative markets to SMEs. 
Improving the risk management practices of SMEs may require even greater efforts. There 
are possibly deeper economic issues regarding the cost of, and access to, such instruments by 
SMEs. Furthermore, as Cowan, et al. conclude, the main mechanism by which exporting firms 
hedge their currency risk is through external borrowing in dollars.10 SMEs, however, have less 
access to both US$ debt and to derivatives. The Cowan, et al., study shows that manufacturing 
SMEs which export have foreign exposure equal to 31% of sales (it is reduced to 27% if the effect 
of US$ borrowing is included). Derivatives markets, however, do not appear to play a significant 
role in reducing their foreign exchange exposures. This points to the need for further research into 
the obstacles faced by SMEs using derivatives to improve their risk management, and into possible 
policy measures designed to improve their access to these markets. 
 
(d) Other market participants such as hedge funds 
It is not possible to know all the various entities who participate in OTC derivatives markets, 
but many of the participants are known because of regulatory disclosure requirements. Pension fund 
regulation requires that derivatives dealers become eligible derivatives counterparties for the 
pension funds. This offers some indication of the identity of the major derivatives dealers in the 
Chilean market. And then of course the pension funds are known to participate as they are required 
to hedge a substantial portion of their foreign exchange exposure. In addition, banking regulation 
requires that banks demonstrate their ability to efficiently manage foreign exchange risk prior to 
                                                     
9  We thank Ricardo Ffrench-Davis for this important point.  
10 Cowan, et al. (2006) study used a sample of almost 5,000 firms, of which almost half are SMEs. 
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their being allowed to act as dealers in options. That provides another source of information of who 
is participating in the markets. Publicly-traded non-financial corporations must also disclose some 
aspects of their derivatives activities in their financial statements.11 Privately held businesses have 
no such reporting requirements. Foreign non-bank entities participating in the market also have no 
such reporting requirements. Individuals using the Chilean derivatives markets to hedge —or 
speculate— face no such reporting requirements. Off-shore participants in the NDF market do not 
report. In short, it is possible to identify some of the derivatives dealers, the pension funds and with 
case-by-case analysis the major non-financial corporations who are using derivatives markets. 
Otherwise there is a substantial short-coming in the data. Other customers, although not identified, 
include hedge funds who use derivatives markets for a variety of reasons. There are also likely to be 
some high net-wealth individuals who have access to the markets. 
Hedge funds and investment banks are believed to play a significant role in Chile’s 
derivatives markets, however the lack of transparency and the lack of reporting requirements mean 
that the particulars are unknown. They are believed to be engaged in investment strategies that 
capture the interest rate differential between the Chilean peso and the Brazilian real (called the 
‘carry trade’) and that between Chilean peso interest rates and copper prices. 
5. History 
There was very little use of derivatives markets for hedging in Chile prior to the late 1990s. This 
was not because there was less need for hedging. After all, Chile had large amounts of foreign 
currency debt and a large share of the economy was linked to traded goods. Chile also faced 
significant risks from exposure to variations in the price of copper and other commodities. The lack 
of hedging, instead, was due to the limited availability of suitable derivatives instruments. 
Many of Chile’s financial and non-financial companies had large net foreign exchange 
exposures. They were surely aware of the risks from potentially large exchange rate movements 
despite the presence of an exchange rate band and of the relative stability of the peso.12 After all, 
companies with unhedged net foreign exchange positions made large losses in the wake of the 1994 
Mexican crisis and the 1997 Asian crisis. 
Since the late 1990s, Chile’s derivatives markets have grown rapidly in total volume, depth 
and in the variety of derivatives instruments. Most of the major companies interviewed for this 
report stated that they hedge any significant net foreign exchange exposure arising from foreign 
indebtedness. Figure 1 illustrates the tremendous rise is hedging activity during this period. Note 
that foreign subsidiaries in Chile said that they did not generally hedge their profit remittance 
payments and that hedging of the payments, if any, was conducted by the parent holding company.  
Also, the private pension fund managers substantially increased their foreign investments 
starting in the late 1990s and they are required by regulation to hedge a large portion of the 
exchange rate risk on those foreign investments.  
There are additional reasons why an increasingly large number of companies in Chile hedge 
their net foreign exchange exposure: rating agencies punish them if they are not fully hedged; 
shareholders look for more stable earnings; and banks want to see such exposures hedged when 
                                                     
11 The IMF, in their FSSA Report from August 2004, pointed out the failure of Chile’s securities disclosure requirements to meet 
international standards in regards to stating the fair value of derivatives positions.  
12 The Chilean Central Bank set a ‘band’ within which the exchange rate was allowed to fluctuate and beyond which it would elicit a 
policy intervention by the Central Bank. 
ECLAC - Project Documents collection  Report on derivatives markets: stabilizing or speculative impact on Chile... 
22 
they lend to them.13 Adding to this is the reduced cost and increased availability of derivatives 
transactions. 
Figure 1 
CHILE’S OTC DERIVATIVES TRADING VOLUME  













Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
 
 
The growth of Chile’s derivatives markets is marked by a few important milestones. The 
most significant development has been the growth of the OTC forward market in foreign exchange. 
This market together with that for cross-currency swaps had $383 billion in trading volume and 
$24.4 billion in open positions at the end of 2005 (recall table 1 and figure 1 above). 
The growth of this market can be largely attributed to the growth in foreign investment by 
pension funds and their hedging of their foreign investment positions back into pesos. Today they 
have amassed over $12 billion in net foreign exchange forward positions that they roll-over 
approximately every 60 days. 
Another key development was the introduction of the long-term cross-currency swap (CCS). 
The figure above illustrates the growth in trading volume for this long-term derivative instrument. 
Providing long-term hedging instruments is often a challenge for market makers, and this is 
especially true in developing countries. The major problem in developing countries is the 
persistence of an unbalanced market —too many short-hedgers compared to long-hedgers and 
speculators. Chile had large amounts of long-term obligations in US dollars that peso earning firms 
wanted to shift into peso obligations, but there was not nearly an equivalent amount of interest in 
shifting from peso obligations into US dollar payments. This one-sided market was a deterrent to 
dealers in offering CCS to the market.  
According to interviews, the solution to this problem was found in a series of transactions 
starting in the year 2000 whereby a highly credit rated entity would borrow in Chilean pesos and 
then swap these peso obligations into US dollars.14 The first of these was conducted between the 
World Bank and Chase Manhattan Bank. In June 2000, The World Bank (I.B.R.D.) issued a 5-year, 
CHP 55 billion bond denominated in Chilean pesos but whose repayment was calculated so as to 
equal a U.F. interest rate. The actual payments were to be made in US dollars but in amounts 
                                                     
13  Interview material. 
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determined by the U.F. rate. Next the World Bank entered into a cross-currency swap with Chase 
that swapped fixed U.F. payments (equivalent to the bond payments) for payments based on US$ 
LIBOR plus a spread. This provided Chase with a long-dated peso obligation, and this allowed it to 
offset the risk of offering the opposite CCS contracts to large Chilean firms that wanted to shift 
their US dollar denominated debt payments into fixed U.F. peso payments. 
Next, in November of 2000, Chase acted as underwriter for the government of Uruguay to 
issue a 7-year, CHP 82 billion bond at a fixed U.F. rate (and payable in US dollars). The Uruguay 
government and Chase then swapped the U.F. peso obligations into US dollars, thus giving Chase a 
7-year tenor on a fixed U.F. peso obligation. This too was used to offset the risk of offering 7-year 
CCS to other banks and non-financial firms in Chile. In March 2001 another similar transaction, 
this time between the government of Uruguay and J.P. Morgan, extended the maturity of the local 
currency bond and the equivalent CCS to 10 years.  
The next big step came in 2002 when CODELCO issued long-dated U.F. denominated debt 
in Chile’s capital market and then swapped it into US dollars with a CCS. (CODELCO wanted US 
dollar obligations to match its export earnings, and it benefited from a more favorable credit spreads 
in Chile than in international markets). This both gave Chase a long-dates peso obligation to offset 
the risk of offering CCS in Chile’s derivatives market but it also demonstrated that a Chilean firm 
could cheaply issue long dated instruments in Chile’s capital markets.  
A similar series of transactions followed with the energy firm ENAP whose revenues 
embodied significant US dollar exposure because the changes in the price of gasoline in Chile 
immediately reflects both changes in the global price of gasoline in dollars plus changes in the 
US$/CHP exchange rate.  
Yet another major event in the development of Chile’s derivatives market was the 
introduction of capital controls in the form of Unremunerated Reserve Requirements (URR) 
—encaje— on capital inflows. This posed a serious challenge for derivatives dealers in the foreign 
exchange market. That market regularly balances itself by using the spot market and the peso or 
dollar credit markets in order to create synthetic short or long positions to lay-off the risk from 
exposure to unequal amounts of long and short transactions in foreign exchange derivatives. In 
order to avoid the cost of URR, foreign owned banks in Chile could use their internal lines of credit 
with their parents or affiliates in New York or London to replicate these synthetic transactions 
without actually transferring funds into or out of the country. 
What this facilitated was the development of the NDF15 market whereby off-shore entities 
could take positions long or short in the peso and then later settle the trades in US dollars – thus not 
having to transfer funds into or out of Chile. It also enabled local Chilean derivatives dealers to 
manage their risks without generating an expensive cross-border transfer of funds. Though this 
technically did not violate the capital controls because there were no capital movements across 
boarders, it did allow the transfer of risk across borders without the usual ties to the actual 
movements of funds. It allowed banks to avoid paying the cost of URRs (encaje), and thereby 
diminished the impact of capital controls on reducing destabilizing effects of exchange rate 
fluctuations. 
As mentioned above, there was little hedging by Chilean firms prior to the East Asian crises 
of 1997-98. It was limited availability of instruments, and lack of market depth that made hedging 
more expensive. For instance, large forward sales of pesos for dollars would move the market away 
from the hedger as it drove down market prices.  
                                                     
15  NDF, or non-deliverable forward, see description of contract above in Market Instruments section. 
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While Chile suffered the effects of the East Asian Crisis in 1997, there was comparatively 
less impact from the Brazilian crisis of 1999. This was due in part to many Chilean corporations 
having hedged their exchange rate exposure.  
There was even less disruption to the Chilean economy during the Argentinean crisis —in 
part because the crisis was seen coming for some time and because more firms were hedged. 
6. Regulation and how it is shaping derivatives markets 
(a) Regulatory authorities 
Chile’s regulatory framework for derivatives is comprised of three main regulatory and 
supervisory authorities. They have a direct role in shaping and overseeing the derivatives markets. 
One is the central bank (BBC) that regulates the “formal” foreign exchange market, and another is 
the bank supervisor (SBIF).16 The central bank’s regulations require financial institutions and non-
financial corporations to report all spot, forward and other exchange rate derivatives transactions. 
This provides information on prices, trade size, maturity, liquidity and position sizes, and this 
provides for better surveillance of these markets. The central bank enforces the reporting 
requirements by guaranteeing only those transactions conducted through this ‘formal’ market to be 
convertible. In practice, transactions are normally convertible and the formal market does not pick 
up transactions by individual and by foreign or off-shore entities. Nonetheless it does provide 
detailed information on the vast majority of the market, and the aggregate of the data ultimately 
made available to market participants to improve their understanding of the pricing process. 
The SBIF establishes regulations that govern how banks can act as derivatives dealers. In 
addition to conducting normal bank examinations, the SBIF sets capital adequacy requirements with 
respect to derivatives positions, oversees use of accounting norms for derivatives, and regulates how 
banks treat customers with foreign exchange exposures. In regards to capital adequacy, banks’ net 
foreign exchange exposure is currently limited to 20% of capital and reserves. There are also daily 
risk exposure limits of 4% of capital. 
SBIF recently drafted regulations that allow banks to act as dealers in options. First, however, 
they are required to demonstrate that they have adopted adequate value-at-risk models for managing 
the greater amount of risk. There is much greater credit risk and market risk from trading options. 
The greater credit risk comes from the upfront payment of premiums in options contracts, and the 
greater market risk comes from the highly exponential relationship between options prices (i.e. 
premiums) and that of the underlying item.   
The third regulatory agency is the supervisor of pension fund managers (SAFP).17 It sets the 
maximum foreign exchange exposure limits for pension fund managers (and thus the minimum 
hedging requirements), requires that pension hedge with dealers that are registered with Chilean 
authorities, and prohibits pension funds from posting collateral with Chilean banks (although they 
can use it in external markets). 
(b) Shaping markets 
Prudential regulation in the sphere of financial markets is usually thought of as a defensive 
policy tool that is designed to protect the financial system and the economy as whole from 
disruptions and crises that originate in, or are transmitted by, the financial institutions or financial 
markets. This study of Chile’s derivatives market offers an additional lesson into the role of 
                                                     
16 Banco Central de Chile, and Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras (www.sbif.cl). 
17  Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (www.safp.cl).  
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prudential regulation. In this case, certain regulations have proven very important in the creation 
and development of deeper and more efficient foreign exchange derivatives markets in Chile.  
Markets do not always arise and develop on their own, nor do they always become 
‘complete’. This can be explained as a result of asymmetric information, costly or critically 
unavailable information, and various types of externalities. It can also arise due to behavioral 
reasons such as bad habits, and economic reasons such as the lack of a critical mass (market is 
unaffordable until sufficient participation raises liquidity and lowers transactions costs). 
Markets are not black boxes in which buyers and sellers are mysteriously matched with 
efficient prices which equilibrate the quantities they wish to buy and sell. Markets have 
microstructures that are comprised of the institutions through which market participants can post 
their bid and offer quotes, negotiate or otherwise match quoted prices at which transactions can be 
executed, and then the transaction settled through the payment of cash against delivery of asset or 
fulfillment of obligation.  
Whether due to intelligent design or just good fortune, several key provisions in Chile’s 
regulatory framework made critical contributions to the creation and development of Chile’s 
derivatives markets.  
Given Chile's policy of private social security or pension funds, the efficient and prudential 
management of these funds requires some degree of international investment in order to obtain a 
sufficiently diversified portfolio for the citizens in an economy strongly affected by copper prices. 
In this context, the decision by the regulatory authority SAFP to set limits on the foreign exchange 
exposure from foreign investments by the pension funds had the effect or creating a strong and 
persistent demand for long forward positions in the OTC foreign exchange derivatives markets. 
This regulatory measure helped to create a more balanced market and a more deep and liquid 
market by adding an enormous volume of end-user activity to the market, and the resulting 
achievement makes it the most important regulatory feature for Chile's derivatives markets.  
Another important regulation for the development of derivatives in Chile was the SAFP's 
requirement for pension funds to conduct their derivatives trading only with registered derivatives 
dealers. This had the result of establishing a network of recognized dealers that were subject to 
public oversight and surveillance. 
Yet another import regulation to help promote the development of the derivatives markets 
was the decision by the SBIF (national banking supervisory authority) to establish capital 
requirements for Chilean banks that allowed lower capital charges on loans to borrowers who 
hedged their foreign exchange exposures. This regulatory measure also promote greater 
participation in the derivatives markets and it worked not by placing requirements on the end-users 
but by placing regulatory incentives on the lenders to end-users. 
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In addition to the above regulatory measures that played key roles in developing the market, 
there is another regulatory measure that will likely prove helpful in promoting the growth —and 
stability— of Chile’s derivatives markets. That measure is the recent change to bankruptcy laws that 
allows derivatives counterparties to treat their derivatives claims against another firm on a  
net basis.  
This is of profound importance in the way that credit exposure it treated. Consider two 
derivatives counterparties that have traded many different derivatives between them and as a result 
have a large amount of outstanding positions between them. This is likely case for two derivatives 
dealers or a dealer and one of their major customers. At any one time, the marked-to-market value 
of these derivatives will show that some gains to one firm and some are gains to the other firm. The 
value of gains less the value of losses is the net amount that one firm owes, or is owed by, the other 
firm at that moment. 
What happens if one of them becomes insolvent and is taken to bankruptcy court. The solvent 
firm wants to collect on their profitable trades with the bankrupt firm, but faces the likelihood that 
the firm will not have enough remaining assets to make all the payments on the derivatives. A 
possibly bigger problem is that the failed firm will want to collect fully on its winnings, which it 
can because its counterparty is not insolvent, but not fully pays on its loses because it is bankrupt. 
In the absence of netting arrangements, the ongoing solvent firm might find that the net gains they 
had when their counterparty went bankrupt have become net losses because it has had to pay fully 
on its losing trades while only collecting partially on its winning trades. 
Netting provisions can prevent this by allowing a counterparty to sue in bankruptcy court for 
only its net claims against the bankrupt counterparty. Even if they do not collect the net gains in 
full, they are protected from any net loses because they cannot be forced to pay on loses unless they 
are in excess of gains on other trades.  
Allowing derivatives counterparties the legal certainty of netting in bankruptcy court will 
greatly improve the ability of dealers to make markets in OTC derivatives. It will also help prevent 
the failure of one major counterparty to inflict substantial losses on other counterparties by making 
them settle gross instead of net. On the other hand it will likely reduce the amount of capital held 
against derivatives positions by banks. Chile bank regulators do not require Chilean banks to hold, 
i.e. to take a capital charge, against the gross amount of the derivatives contracts that have a positive 
market value. (They are not allowed to reduce their exposure to any one counterparty by the amount 
of losses on derivatives with that counterparty.) The netting provision will result in bank regulators 
allowing Chilean banks to hold capital only against the net value of their exposure to its various 
derivatives counterparties. 
(c) Regulatory issues 
A regulatory measure that is frustrating the development of Chile’s derivatives market is the 
accounting treatment of the use of derivatives for hedging. Several of the representatives of non-
financial companies complained of this problem. They pointed out that the accounting treatment 
resulted in their reported earnings appearing to be more volatile —instead of less— as a result of 
using derivatives to hedge. In other words, indeed of reported earnings reflecting the economic 
reality that the firm was reducing the volatility of its profits by hedging, it instead made those 
profits look more volatile by requiring the changes in the value of hedge be reported differently that 
the value of the item being hedged. 
Consider the treatment of cash flow hedges.18 Firms are required to report gains or losses on 
the hedge irrespective of whether the underlying payment has occurred. Thus losses on a derivatives 
                                                     
18  See Fernandez (2006) for further discussion. 
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contract used to hedge a planned sale might end up being reported prior to the time when sale 
occurred. If the hedge extends across two reporting periods, then it might show up as a substantial 
loss in the first period and a substantial gain in the second period just because it ended up at the 
same initial price. The firm benefits from having its sale price hedged over the two periods, but it 
loses because its financial statement shows the appearance of a volatility of gains and losses. 
Another important regulatory issue pertains to the use of collateral in Chilean derivatives 
markets.19 At present they are devoid of collateral requirements and almost devoid of the use of 
collateral in actual market practice. Non-financial firms describe in interviews that they do not use 
it. Pension funds, as pointed out by interviews with pension fund managers and supervisors, are 
prohibited from posting it with domestic counterparties. Banks claim that requiring collateral it 
would discourage customers. Market participants and bank regulators also point out in interviews 
there are no provisions in their derivative contracts that allow one counterparty to demand collateral 
from another in the event that credit exposure grows or exceeds credit exposure limits. Altogether, 
this results in a market that is seriously lacking in collateral that is needed to ensure the prompt and 
complete performance on a large and growing amount of derivatives transactions. 
The lack of adequate procedures for the use of collateral not only poses greater systemic risk 
for the financial system, it also impedes the growth of the market. It impedes growth in two ways. 
First, the proper use of collateral could facilitate small and medium sized enterprises to participate 
in the market —currently these small cap firms are deterred by a marketplace that trades on capital. 
Second, the use of collateral will eventually enable pension funds to make full use of hedging in 
regards to their investment strategies by allowing them to employ longer dated foreign exchange 
derivatives and interest rate swaps and options that can be combined with their fixed income 
securities portfolio. 
 
                                                     
19  Collateral is also known as margin, and is usually in the form of cash or liquid government securities.  
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Part II 
7. Derivatives and international capital flows  
Derivative markets are enormous and rapidly growing, and their 
expansion to developing countries raises important new questions 
about their role in economic development.20 Their impact on 
international economic stability should be considered as important, or 
as potentially important, as that for foreign bank loans and portfolio 
investments. Despite their size and prominence, derivatives markets 
have only recently come to the fore as a concern for international 
policy makers and researchers.  
The most important economic policy issue raised by the growth 
and development of Chile’s derivatives market is their impact on 
international capital flows. These concerns have focused on four basic 
questions. These are: 
• Whether or not risk-shifting and price discovery, the two key 
economic functions of derivatives markets, encourage or 
discourage the net flow of capital to developing countries? 
• Whether or not using derivatives to hedge the foreign 
exchange risk of investing in developing country generates a 
comparable amount of capital outflows? 
 
                                                     
20   See Financial Policy Forum, Special Policy Briefs 24, 25 and 27. 
ECLAC - Project Documents collection  Report on derivatives markets: stabilizing or speculative impact on Chile... 
30 
• Whether or not there is any cyclical dimension to the role of derivatives in international 
capital flows or in the determination of exchange rates? 
• Whether or not derivatives markets make developing country financial systems more 
vulnerable to instability and thereby discourage the flow of capital to developing 
countries? 
The first question asks whether the economic benefits of derivatives markets, namely price 
discovery and risk-shifting, have a positive effect on the volume and stability of international 
capital flows. The second, and for many the most important issue, is whether hedging activities off-
set or neutralize the benefits of capital inflows by generating an equal amount of capital outflows. 
These concerns have been raised by economic studies that have identified reciprocal capital 
outflows arising from hedging activities.[add citations] The third issue is whether derivatives 
trading aggravates or exacerbates capital flows and especially in regards to cyclical capital flows or 
highly volatile capital flows. These concerns were raised by some of the financial crises that hit 
developing country financial markets during the 1990s.21 This study looks specifically at recent 
events in Chile and Brazil in which the investment strategies of hedge funds and investment banks 
appear to have substantial pro-cyclical pressures on exchange rate movements. 
The fourth issue is whether the derivatives markets, especially inadequately regulated 
derivatives markets, make financial institutions and financial systems more vulnerable to market 
distortions and disruptions and thereby discourage international capital flows. 
(a) Does it encourage greater international investment?  
Regarding the first issue, the economic benefit of foreign capital inflows is that they augment 
domestic savings so as to finance additional investment. It can also, in the form of foreign direct 
investment, facilitate technology transfers and can add to the availability of foreign exchange. 
Derivatives can promote greater international investment by improving asset pricing and especially 
by facilitating risk management. Sometimes securities, loans and other assets are traded in markets 
that are characterized by transparent trading or centralized pricing or benchmark pricing. In these 
circumstances, derivatives markets can improve upon the efficiency of the price determination 
process. For example, farm products are often sold by their producers in many different and 
dispersed markets so that the prices established in these markets do not otherwise result in a 
national price or a benchmark price. Derivatives markets can do this. Similarly, bank loan rates 
might not be known nationally, but derivatives trading on various interest rates can set nationally 
known benchmarks. In Brazil, the future on the overnight interest rate has the largest trading 
volume on BM&F derivatives exchange. 
Price discovery also allows for the various types of risk associated with an investment to be 
broken down and priced separately. It allows the credit risk to be priced separately from the foreign 
exchange risk and from the interest rate risk. For example, buying a Euro denominated corporate 
bond involves, at the least, foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk and credit risk. Derivatives 
markets can price the dollar-euro exchange rate into the future, they can price the single currency 
(euro) interest rate risk, and credit derivatives can price the credit risk. Investors and speculators can 
then know the value of these risk components and then hedge or take risky positions in those 
components if desired. 
Hedging or risk shifting gives new meaning to “from the haves to the have nots” —it 
involves the redistribution of risk from those who have and do not want it to those more willing or 
able to bear it. This need not necessarily be viewed as safe versus reckless or prudent versus 
fearless. For example, a farmer hedges by selling coffee futures while Starbucks hedges by buying 
                                                     
21   Several studies are discussed in Dodd (2002).  
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coffee futures. If the farmer sells to Starbucks (who buys), then both reduce their risk through the 
same transaction. While this eliminate of risk does not happen in all cases, it does occur to the 
extent that the derivatives market is comprised of both short hedgers and long hedgers. In other 
cases of unequal amounts of long and short hedgers, the parties taking the risk hold it on 
speculation. 
What effect does this have on international investment decisions? More efficient pricing of 
assets and the risk component of assets should encourage more foreign investment because they 
would be more confident that they are paying efficient or fair market prices and receiving market 
efficient rates of return on their investment (i.e. they are getting what they pay for).  
Risk shifting should attract more foreign investment because investors who do not want all 
the various types of risks associated with owning a foreign asset can now make the investment with 
the reasonable expectation of being able to hedge away unwanted risk-components such as 
exchange rate risk or credit risk. 
In these ways derivatives markets can clearly encourage greater foreign investment in 
developing countries, but whether they actually do so depends upon how well the derivatives 
markets themselves perform in those financial markets. The following explores the circumstances 
under which this is more or less likely to occur. 
(b) Does hedging negate the benefit of capital inflows?  
Derivatives markets in developing countries are often different from those in developed 
countries. Investors in developing countries, both foreign and domestic, need to hedge primarily 
against a fall in the value of the local currency. Almost no one wants to take additional long 
positions22 in the local currency, i.e. no one wants to hold pesos or rupees unnecessarily. This 
makes it hard to create derivatives markets because trading requires both a buyer and a seller —one 
party to take the long side and another to take the short side. There are, of course, periods when 
developing countries’ currencies have appreciated, such as the experience in recent years, but the 
more usual market condition consists of expectations of a depreciating currency value. This one-
sidedness of the marketplace, due to more short-hedgers than long-hedgers, is a challenge to 
complete derivatives markets.  
So in the “normal” situation if investors want to hedge against a decline in the value of the 
local currency, what can they do? Who will take the long side? Or in other words, how can a 
derivatives market exist in local currency exchange rate risk?  
If there are more short hedgers than long hedgers in a derivatives markets the only way for all 
the short sellers to find long buyers is for speculators or arbitragers to take positions in the market. 
And if no one wants to speculate by holding the local currency risk outright, then what? The answer 
can be found in how derivatives dealers manage their ‘book’ or portfolio of derivatives trades so as 
to maintain a flat or nearly flat book of positions. They do not sell short unless they can offset the 
position by buying long, and vice versa. When there is no one to sell short to, then the dealer is 
reluctant to buy long and market trading volume and liquidity suffer. 
One solution to this dilemma is for the derivatives dealer to create a synthetic short local 
currency position to lay off the risk of taking the long position in the derivatives market. Creating 
such a synthetic short position is simple. It involves the following steps: 
 
• Borrow local currency through a bank loan.  
                                                     
22   The term ‘long’ refers to an investment position that is equivalent to holding the local currency.  “Long” is what you own or buy, and 
“short” is what you owe or sell.  
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• Buy dollars with the local currency in the spot foreign exchange market.  
• Invest dollars in dollar assets abroad, and ideally do so at a maturity which matches that of 
the loan.  
• This leaves the dealer ‘short’ because it owes the local currency required to repay the 
loan.  
What this means is that the dealers in derivatives markets, in so far that they use synthetic 
positions to manage their ‘book,’ generate a capital outflow as they take out local currency loans 
and invest it abroad in dollar assets. Thus if the foreign investor who is bringing capital into the 
developing country (whether as DFI or portfolio investment) tries to hedge the local currency risk, 
and the derivatives market requires the use of synthetic short positions in order to complete the 
market, then the act of hedging capital inflows will result in similar amounts of capital outflows.  
A similar outflow might occurs if a Chilean (or Brazilian) firm were to borrow abroad in 
foreign currency and then hedges its exchange rate risk by selling pesos for US dollars in the 
forward market. If a dealer in the foreign exchange forward market were to use a “synthetic” 
forward to complete the market, then an offsetting capital outflow would occur. In both cases this 
would negate the effect of foreign capital inflows augmenting domestic savings as a source of 
investment or alternatively financing additional imports.  
The problem identified in this example is that the use of peso credit to purchase US dollar 
assets amounts to a capital outflow. The amount of the outflow is roughly equivalent to the amount 
of capital inflows that are being hedged. Thus the benefit of foreign capital inflows augmenting 
domestic savings is off-set to the extent that those foreign capital inflows are hedged in a manner 
that leads to reciprocal capital outflows.  
It should be pointed out that the sale of dollars for pesos to repay the peso loan is a reversal 
of the reciprocal capital outflow, and that the hedging activity would thus not result in a capital 
outflow over time. This point, however, overlooks the fact that so long as the foreign investment is 
hedged, the derivatives dealer in turn will lay-off its side of the hedge and that this might entail 
maintaining or rolling-over in succession this peso loan and dollar asset transaction until the 
hedging has ceased. In this way the capital outflow backing the dealer’s position would possibly 
last as long as the hedged foreign investment. If so, it would offset the benefits arising from 
augmenting savings as long as the foreign investment was hedged. 
This problem of offsetting capital inflows, though real and present is likely to diminish as the 
foreign exchange derivatives markets grow larger and deeper so that synthetic positions become less 
and less necessary to complete the market. This does not mean that the situation will never repeat 
again, but rather that it will become less frequent or significant. However, when the market becomes 
one-sided and there are more buyers (or sellers) of the peso in the derivatives market, the problem 
of off-setting flows returns.  
A closer inspection of the functioning of Chile’s derivatives markets indicates that dealers 
face many opportunities to lay-off such short peso positions with other entities that are long hedgers 
or are otherwise taking long positions in the foreign exchange derivatives market. This arises in part 
from a somewhat unique feature of the Chilean market in which Chile’s pension funds are required 
to hedge a large share of the exchange rate risk from their foreign investments. When they hedge 
their foreign currency denominated assets back into pesos they become long hedgers.  
Additional long hedgers in the Chilean market include exporters who earn hard currency 
revenue but must cover most of their expenses and payments in pesos. Others entities might be 
taking, or be willing to take, long positions in the Chilean peso for speculative purposes. Together 
these amount to a sizable opportunity to lay-off short hedging positions without having to engage in 
the series of credit market and spot foreign exchange market transactions needed to create a 
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synthetic position. If derivatives dealers do not take out peso loans to make dollar investments, then 
there is no capital outflow resulting from the hedging activity. 
What about the role of the market for NDF (non-deliverable forward foreign exchange 
contracts)? Might the NDF market affect whether hedging results in capital outflows? It is not likely 
because it is economically the same as the regular foreign exchange forward market. The NDF 
operates to save on the transactions costs of making and taking delivery of the underlying 
currencies, and these costs are often greater for off-shore entities. NDF can also be used to handle 
accounts between affiliates within a conglomerate bank. In this case, capital may not move in a 
physical or even financial transaction sense but merely by the Chilean subsidiary showing an 
increase in dollar assets and the parent showing a dollar liability. Transactions costs are affected by 
certain tax policies as well as capital controls, and so the NDF market also reflects efforts to avoid 
those policies. The NDF market is thus often a source of frustration for policy effectiveness. 
In summary, hedging can negate the benefit of capital inflows to augment domestic savings 
and provide additional foreign exchange (it might nonetheless transfer technology or have other 
collateral benefits or costs). Also, hedging will not negate the benefit of capital inflows if and when 
the derivatives market has equivalent amounts of short and long hedgers —or otherwise long 
speculators— so that the market can be completed without resorting to creating synthetic positions. 
(c) Do derivatives markets play any cyclical role in international 
capital flows? 
There are several ways in which derivatives markets can potentially add to the cyclicality or 
volatility of international capital flows. This potentiality does not mean that they necessarily will 
have that effect. Nor does it mean that the likelihood of these effects cannot be reduced by properly 
designed regulations. The point of discussion in this section is to identify these vulnerabilities, 
analyze how they occur and then start to explore how proper regulatory measures can help remedy 
the problem. 
One way in which derivatives markets can aggravate volatility and pro-cyclicality is when 
market participants with short US dollar (or other hard currency) positions act to hedge that 
exposure only after the forward or spot exchange rate depreciates, or when pressures for such a 
depreciation are building up This arises when Chilean entities with US dollar debt or Chilean 
importers or foreign investors in Chile —all of which are likely to have net foreign exchange risk 
exposure— do not maintain a hedged position but instead plan to enter into hedged positions if the 
situation changes. This is a simple variant of what is known as ‘dynamic’ hedging. This result is a 
pro-cyclical market pressure from selling pesos when the value is declining and not selling (or 
buying back) when prices are rising. 
Another source of pro-cyclical market pressure comes from the investment strategy pursued 
by hedge funds, and investment banks, to profit from the carry trade of borrowing in Chilean pesos 
and lending in Brazil real. This works in a pro-cyclical way when the hedge funds sell Chilean peso 
to commence the investment while the peso’s value is falling or when they unwind their positions 
when the peso strengthens (we discuss more thoroughly below). This results in selling pesos when 
the value of the currency falls and buying when it rises. These actions are in contrast to the claims 
made by many defenders of speculation who insist that speculators are contrarians who sell when 
the price gets high and buy when the price gets low. 
In addition to the peso-real carry trade investment strategy, hedge funds engage in a similar 
investment strategy using the copper futures markets (if the forward price curve for copper is flatter 
than peso interest rates or the forward price curve for the peso-dollar foreign exchange forward, 
then a short copper position is cheaper —and the carry profits greater— than these other two 
alternatives). 
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Yet another pro-cyclical impact from foreign exchange derivatives markets can occur they 
are used to increase foreign exchange exposure —i.e. speculate— instead of hedging. This can add 
to financial sector vulnerability and can result in a faster, deeper financial crisis (Dodd, 2002). 
(d) Do derivatives improve financial stability?  
Greater financial stability will encourages greater capital inflows, while reduced stability 
should do the opposite. The question hinges on whether derivatives help or harm financial sector 
stability. 
Some have argued that derivatives markets make a financial system more stable. The former 
chair of the US Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, has repeatedly argued that large scale use of 
derivatives by banks has made the US financial system and the overall economy more stable. The 
basic point is that banks and key financial institutions use derivatives to improve their risk 
management. This allows them to pursue their best business opportunities while avoiding unwanted 
or unwarranted risks by transferring it to others through derivatives markets. The result is a system 
of financial institutions that are more safe and sound. Greenspan cites the lack of failures by 
financial institutions during the last US recession as evidence for this constructive role. 
Others have argued that while hedging can make firms more safe and sound, the OTC 
derivatives markets often do not operate according to safe and sound financial practices and that 
their large and growing economic role makes financial systems overall less stable.23 Derivatives 
markets operate at lower prudential standard than most traditional banking, securities or insurance 
markets. Examples of this include the following. 
• Derivatives provide greater leverage and cheaper exposure to market risk – this means that 
it is easier to take larger risks, that losses can rapidly escalate, and that rare events can 
have greater impacts than they otherwise would. It also means that losses due to market 
risk become greater credit exposures and greater potential credit losses. 
• The greater leverage arises from the absence of collateral requirements and lower effective 
capital requirements. Inadequate collateral and capital leave derivatives markets more 
vulnerable in times of stress. This is one of the more significant problems with Chile’s 
derivatives markets.  
• OTC derivatives markets face greater exposure to liquidity risk. OTC markets can dry up 
at the worst time as dealers withdraw from markets and other participants hesitate to trade 
with any dealer viewed to be “at risk.”  
• OTC derivatives markets have poor clearing and settlement arrangements and this results 
in greater exposure to operations risk.  
• OTC derivatives markets do not have adequate anti-fraud and anti-manipulation 
prohibitions and enforcement authorities.  
In sum, derivatives have the potential to encourage international capital inflows. They can 
improve pricing efficiency and provide means for investors to better manage their risks so as to 
encourage greater amounts of investment.  
That potential may not be realized, however, and derivatives market may end up discouraging 
capital flows. This is more apt to happen if markets are perceived as disorderly or lacking safe and 
sound business practices, and this is more likely to arise when derivatives markets lack adequate 
regulation and supervision. It is also apt to happen in underdeveloped markets where dealers 
generate capital outflows in order to create synthetic short positions to complete markets. In order to 
                                                     
23   Dodd (2004 and 2005). 
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assure that derivatives market function to encourage international capital flows and not hinder them, 
they need appropriate regulatory measures that will promote their efficient and orderly use by 
maintaining prudential standards for safety and soundness.  
8. Can certain investment strategies impact the exchange rate? 
One investment strategy that came up in many interviews with market participants was the peso-real 
carry trade. This hedge fund and investment bank investment strategy involves taking a short-
position in Chilean pesos and a long position in the Brazilian real in order to capture the difference 
in Chilean and Brazilian interest rates. This strategy is premised on the notion that the inherent 
currency risk is limited by the correlation between the real and the peso. The correlation means that 
a reduction in the value of the Brazilian real would be offset by gains on the short peso position. 
Indeed, the Chilean peso exhibited a high level of correlation with the Brazilian real according to 
the LACI index of JPMorgan and Bloomberg. This correlation, combined with the fact that Chilean 
Peso interest rates were amongst the lowest in the region, implied that the peso became the currency 
of choice for a carry trade with the real (interview material, Beltran Del Ramon, 
et al., 2005). 
There are a few different ways to execute this strategy. One way is to sell the peso short in 
the forward market, and buy the real long in the forward market.  The non-deliverable forward 
market for Chilean pesos serves this purpose.  
Another way is to borrow the Chilean pesos at the low peso interest rates and then buy US 
dollars in the spot market, and then real with the dollars, and finally invest in a liquid asset in real. 
The gains will be the difference in the real and peso interest rates and any change in the exchange 
rate when the positions are reversed. If the correlation of the exchange rates holds perfectly, then 
the profit would be the difference of the interest rates.  
This strategy, according to interviews, was popular with hedge funds and foreign investment 
banks in the early part of 2005. When the peso began to strengthen against the real (hence becoming 
uncorrelated), these positions were unwound in June and July of that year (see in  
figure 1). The peso initially strengthened as a result of sharp increases in the price of copper and the 
real weakened due to political problems linked to charges of alleged corruption in the Brazilian 
government. The unwinding of these positions —positions which are large, and which exceeded  
$5 billion, see figure 1— had the effect of putting further upwards pressure on the peso, thus acting 
in a pro-cyclical fashion to push the value of the peso beyond what was warranted by the 
fundamentals (including the higher price for copper). 
As shown in figure 1, the net offshore position of banks and non-banks increased again in 
October 2005, which coincided with a slight depreciation of the peso. This would seem to provide 
initial evidence that changes in net offshore positions affect the exchange rate, and that the 
unwinding of positions strengthened the Chilean peso. 
Further empirical evidence is provided by econometric analysis conducted by the staff of the 
Chilean Central Bank (Marinovic, 2006; Selaive and Alarcon, 2006). The former (Marinovic, 
2006), adopting an approach based on the microstructure of the exchange rate market, focuses on 
the fact that the level of Non-Deliverable Forwards24 between Chilean residents and non-residents 
for peso-dollars have significantly increased. Her econometric analysis shows that for the 2004-06 
period, the level of NDFs contributes, at a significant level, to explain the evolution of the nominal 
exchange rate, particularly within the next week and the periods up to two months. According to 
Marinovic’s estimates, an increase of 1% in the net positions of NDFs on average during 2004-06 
                                                     
24  Non Deliverable Forwards (NDFs) are the instruments used for the peso-real carry trade by offshore actors, as described above. 
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leads to a depreciation of the peso of 0.02% during the following two months. This is because an 
increase of one standard deviation (60%) in the change in net NDFs is associated to a depreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate by approximately 1.2% in the next two months. 
Selaive and Alarcon (2006) provide complementary analysis. They find a significant 
statistical daily association between NDF positions and the exchange rate for the second half of 
2005, when a fall of US$100m of the NDF positions —equal to around 2% of the total outstanding 
amounts at the end of 2005— was associated with to an appreciation to the US$. For previous 
periods, changes in NDF positions were not significant, whilst the price of copper was significant 
for the whole 2001-06 period.  
Selaive and Alarcon op. cit. correctly stress that, as NDFs have increased their share within 
the foreign exchange derivatives market in Chile (to 34%), they have become an important 
proportion of the total spot and forward foreign exchange markets. As a consequence, it is an 
important channel through which NDFs influence the exchange rate through their effect on the 
supply and demand of foreign exchange. There may, however, be other special transmission 
channels from NDFs to the exchange rate, such as asymmetries of information and difference in the 
behavior of agents (Lyons, 2004). 
The key point is that offshore (or NDF) positions are large (they are reportedly in excess of 
US$6 billion) and their magnitudes fluctuate significantly. Large changes of these positions, by 
hedge funds and other international financial institutions, can lead at times to an exacerbation of 
cycles. This is of special concern for recent periods of exchange rate appreciation. Excess currency 
appreciation can be damaging to Chilean exports. Alternatively, these large positions could lead to 
excessive exchange rate depreciations under different circumstances.  
There are two particular additional sources of concern about these activities. One is that they 
are driven basically by the search of very large short-term profits and are not linked to differences 
in countries’ fundamentals. Secondly, these activities by international —mainly US and 
European— hedge funds and investment banks are totally unregulated; even if they were regulated 
nationally, this may not be sufficient, and international coordination may be required to make such 
regulation effective, though it may not be easy to achieve. Institutions like the BIS, the Financial 
Stability Forum or the IMF could provide support for such measures.  
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9. What do derivatives markets mean for the hierarchy of 
volatility? 
This section addresses several key questions about derivatives, volatility and their role in the macro 
economy. One key question for this study is whether derivatives markets are more or less volatile 
than that for loans, portfolio investments in stocks or bonds, of foreign direct investment, and 
whether they change the volatility of those various types of capital flows? Do they in fact 
undermine the idea of a hierarchy of volatility? A related question is what is the impact of 
derivatives on the exchange rate market, and is there a cyclical effect? 
Any answer depends firstly on how volatility is measured —year to year, month to month, 
day to day or moment to moment. This is an important distinction. A market price may have little 
year to year volatility, but experience comparatively greater intraday movements. For example, the 
S&P500 index was largely unchanged over the calendar year 1994, but it did exhibit considerable 
intraday and day to day volatility. Alternatively, a market can have serious year to year volatility, 
but exhibit relatively small day to day movements. For example, the US dollar-euro exchange rate 
has moved up and down considerably since 2000 —moving more than 50% from January 2002 to 
the end of 2004. However there are very few days when it has changed as much as 2%. The point is 
that volatility may be significantly higher at one frequency than another, and comparison across 
derivatives and various types of capital flows needs to address these distinctions. The volatility we 
are most concerned with in this study relates to major changes in trends.  
Consider first the case of non-financial corporations that face exchange rate exposure from 
external debt denominated in hard currency and revenues denominated in Chilean pesos. At times 
they have been largely unhedged in regards to this exchange rate risk —a condition that might be 
called passive speculation on the peso. This changed starting in 1998 as they began to increase their 
hedging on a very large scale. Figure 2 on Net Positions shows that their net outstanding forward 
positions increased by US$ 4,115 million from 1998 to the end of 1999. This hedging, which 
increased the sale of pesos in the forward and CCS markets, was concurrent with the depreciation of 
the peso exchange rate during that period. Hedging, in this instance, appears to have contributed to 
the pro-cyclical movement in the exchange rate. 
Econometric analysis of daily data supports the claim that there is a strong explanatory link 
between the amount of daily net positions of corporations and the level of the Chilean nominal 
peso-dollar exchange rate for the 1998-99 period (see table 4). The results, which are significant at 
95%, hold both for contemporaneous analysis (zero lag, or K=0) and for lags of five days (K= 5). 
As can be seen in figure 3, net positions of the non-financial corporations increased dramatically 
during 1998-99, but varied far less after 1999. According to interviews, the leveling of net positions 
is thought to reflect non-financial companies having become sufficiently hedged. This explains a far 
lower, though still significant at 95%, R² for the whole 1998-2006 period.  
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Figure 2 



































































































































































































Net Positions, Copper Price and Nominal Exchange Rate, 1998-2005
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Table 4 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES AND NET POSITIONS 
NERt = α + βNETPOSITIONSt-k + et 
 
  1998-99 1998-2006 
  Positions Positions 
k=0 Parameter 0,017948 0,025326 
 S.E. N-W 0,001101 0,002751 
 R2 0,83 0,15 
k=5 Parámetro 0,018102 0,025486 
 S.E. N-W 0,001058 0,00274 
 R2 0,84 0,15 
Source of data: Central Bank of Chile. 
S.E. N-W = Standard error of Newey-West. 
Note: The estimates we carried out with daily data on the level of nominal exchange rate (NER) and the 
level of the net positions of non-financial corporations; we used minimum squares corrected for 
heterokedasticity and autocorrelation via Newey-West standard errors. Bold font figures reflect that all the 
parameters are significant at 95% confidence levels. 
 
 
Therefore, if derivatives are widely used for hedging, e.g. foreign direct investors with local 
currency revenues are hedged (as many large firms currently claim to be as they expressed during 
detailed interviews and as is consistent with figures 1 and 3, which show the stability of non-
financial corporations net positions) then the hierarchy of volatility still holds, as these foreign 
investors would not exert much additional pressure on the foreign exchange market in times 
of crisis. In that case, foreign direct investment would continue to be less volatile than  
short-term flows. 
The use of derivatives to hedge foreign exchange exposure, and thereby reduce the impact of 
exchange rate volatility during critical moments of instability, would support efforts —regulatory 
and otherwise— to encourage if not require borrowers as well as firms in the tradable goods sectors 
to hedge such risks.  
There may be a case therefore for ensuring that companies (especially large ones) with 
considerable dollar liabilities and peso incomes are hedged from the start. This could be achieved 
via direct or indirect regulation. In markets such as the current Chilean one, such hedging is not at 
all expensive. It would be advantageous, both for the firm (for whom unhedged positions are 
potentially very costly, as was shown by big losses of some companies in Chile in 1998-9), and 
from a macro-economic perspective, as it will avoid additional pro-cyclical pressure on the 
exchange rate, both in times of large inflows and especially in times of large outflows. This is an 
important lesson that other developing countries can draw from the Chilean experience.  
There would seem to be a similar case for encouraging or requiring that foreign investments 
by Chilean firms be hedged, in times of downward pressure on the peso, as clearly was the case in 
1998-9 in Chile (Ffrench-Davis and Tapia, 2001 and Zahler, 2006), with a rapid and pro-cyclical 
increase in foreign investment by Chilean pension funds.  
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Table 5 








1998 412 -233 1 407 -1 599 
1999 -4 -1 107 2 708 -1 590 
2000 -162 115 -581 874 
2001 -513 -132 464 -93 
2002 -545 -942 -745 2 575 
2003 801 -4 577 864 2 593 
2004 207 -1 768 464 241 
2005 -1 427 -3 254 599 680 
Source: Central Bank database. Author's calculations. 
 
 
There may therefore be a case for restricting the scale of the outflow of pension funds during 
certain periods (as suggested by Zahler, 2006) and Fontaine, 1996) or to only allow such large 
outflows in periods of expected depreciation if such additional foreign investment by pension funds 
is hedged. For the latter, regulations would need to be lifted that currently somewhat restrict 
hedging by Chilean pension funds, especially for using long-term instruments. This would help 
make it cheaper for pension funds to hedge and would allow longer term hedging. However, as 
discussed in what follows, hedging of pension fund outflows in periods of expected appreciation of 
the peso would be undesirable. It may therefore, not be easy to use regulations on hedging by 
pension funds, to increase their stabilizing or counter-cyclical role, unless such regulations are 
changed through the cycle. This may be too complex to implement effectively.  
Specifically in the period 1998-99, hedging by pension funds was partial, as there was an 
increase in investment abroad by Chilean pension funds of US$4,162 million between December 
1997 and1999 (see table 6), whilst the net increase in outstanding foreign exchange forwards was 
only US$1,340 million (which represented only 32% of outflows). Therefore, the net impact of 
pension fund outflows during that period was US$2,822 million, which implied that significant 
additional pressure was exerted on the peso to weaken. In interviews it was argued by pension fund 
managers that pension funds initially needed some foreign exchange exposure, and therefore did not 
hedge their initial increased investment abroad that was facilitated by further liberalizing the capital 
account; this limited hedging however was mainly encouraged by the fact that it was more 
profitable to invest abroad and not to hedge, given the expectations of the peso falling, in the wake 
of the Asian and Russian crises. It is worth pointing out, that this lower level of hedging is 
consistent with the self-fulfilling expectations of capital outflows of pension funds driving own the 
value of the peso. 
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Table 6 




Changes in net 
outstanding forward 
1998 1 399 -233 
1999 2 773 -1 107 
2000 -1 759 115 
2001 734 -132 
2002 1 332 -942 
2003 5 727 -4 577 
2004 5 330 -1 768 
2005 8 000 -3 254 
Source: SAFP and Central Bank. 
 
Thus, during 1998 and 1999, there was a combination of non-financial big companies 
(mainly in the telecommunications and energy sector) hedging on a significant scale, by buying 
dollars forward, and pension funds investing abroad on a large scale (with partial hedging) implying 
that due to both factors, there was major pressure on the peso to weaken from these flows, both on 
the spot and the forward market, which it did. This contributed to the need for a sharp macro-
economic adjustment that led to a fall in GDP of 1% (Ffrench-Davis and Tapia, 2001). 
The situation changed starting in 2000. Large companies report that for the last several years 
they have had their net foreign exchange exposure more completely hedged. This is reflected in the 
relatively small changes in their net outstanding forward positions (see table 1) over this period. On 
the other hand, pension funds hedged around 80% of their investments abroad in 2003 (see table 6). 
This foreign investment would only exert limited countervailing pressure to moderate the 
significant strengthening of the peso. However, in 2004 and 2005, there were again large outflows 
by pension funds, but there was a smaller proportion of hedging (see again table 6), of 40% or less 
during those two years, which implies that the outflows by pension funds did have an effect in 
slowing the important appreciation of the peso.  
Therefore, hedging of their large investment abroad by pension funds is stabilizing the 
exchange rate in times of expected peso depreciation, but implies less of a stabilizing role of 
pension fund outflows in times of expected appreciation.  
What becomes increasingly important for Latin American countries is not just how 
derivatives are regulated, but also how (and how much) their use by firms, pension funds, etc is 
regulated, so their impact is not too pro-cyclical, or (ideally) could be neutral or even counter-
cyclical. This is quite difficult, as derivatives are currently not very regulated, the aim of this 
limited regulation is not linked to macroeconomic concerns e.g. of pro-cyclicality, and in some 
cases, regulations on hedging would have to be changed according to cycles of exchange rate 
trends, and/or capital flows. Further research and policy discussion seems to be required.  
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10. Regulatory proposals to improve Chile’s derivatives markets 
The goal is to ensure that derivatives markets are sound, safe and efficient. That is, to help ensure 
sound institutions and stable financial systems; to ensure safe markets that are free of fraud, 
manipulation and predatory practices aimed at consumers and small investors, and to promote 
efficient markets —the focus of which is pricing efficiency and transactions costs. 
The regulatory framework is built upon three pillars. 
(i)  Registration and reporting requirements. 
(ii) Capital and collateral requirements. 
(iii) Orderly Market Rules such as position limits, price movement limits (sometimes called 
circuit breakers), requiring dealers to maintain bid and ask quotes throughout the 
trading day. 
More specifically, these regulatory measures should look like the following. 
(a) Registration and reporting requirements 
Regarding registration requirements, registration is a means to insure that all financial 
institutions meet minimum standards, that the regulatory authorities has a census of all relevant 
financial institutions, and it provides an easy way to identify illegitimate businesses and for the 
regulatory author to shut down illegal activity. Minimum standards should include a sound business 
plan, that the firm be well managed, that it meets capital requirements and that its key employees be 
certified as competent and trustworthy. 
Key individuals, such as a financial institution's representative agents and "appropriate 
persons" as well as independent brokers, agents and investment advisors, should be registered or 
licensed. The registration of individuals sets minimum standards for people that carry fiduciary 
responsibility for the firm or customer accounts are critical to the process of preventing and 
prosecuting fraud. In many cases, registration should require that applicants pass an examination of 
competence. Registration allows regulatory authorities to conduct background checks on 
individuals —who act as brokers, agents or salespeople— who have fiduciary responsibility over 
the firm's or their customers’ accounts. The background checks should test for past criminal conduct 
because individuals convicted of fraud should not be allowed to act as brokers or other responsible 
persons (front-line representatives of financial institutions).  
Reporting requirements should apply to all derivatives dealers and major market participants 
(this is effectively the case in Chile's foreign exchange forward market because of pension fund 
reporting and the central bank's formal market requirements). These entities should also be required 
to keep proper records for five or more years. 
Especially important are large trader reports. The information acquired by the regulatory 
authority through these reporting requirements should help their efforts in market surveillance. The 
public interest is best protected when the regulatory authority has sufficient information to police 
malfeasance and help prevent market disruptions caused by fraud and manipulation. Up to date 
financial information on firms and markets should also give the government an early warning of 
firms that were in trouble due to taking a large losses on big market. 
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Well informed investors are the key to establishing efficient financial markets, and reporting 
requirements are essential to providing them will the relevant market information they need. 
Businesses, taken individually, have incentives to hoard information or report it in a selective 
manner. Reporting requirements assure markets that corporations provide all appropriate 
information under uniform rules so that the public has the potential to make rational, fully informed 
investment decisions. In order to bring off-balance sheet activities into the same light as balance 
sheets activities, derivatives activities would be reported by notional value (long and short), 
maturity, instrument and collateral arrangements. This will enable investors to better determine 
whether the firm was under- or over-hedged, and whether they were primarily acting as a producer 
or wholesaler. 
(b) Capital and collateral requirements 
Require minimum capital requirements for all derivatives dealers and set minimum collateral 
requirements for derivatives transactions. Collateral requirements for financial transactions function 
much like capital requirements for financial institutions: both provide a buffer against financial 
failure, and both provide incentives to economize on risk-taking by raising the cost of holding open 
positions. Collateral requirements apply to all transactions, not just some institutions, and thus 
govern to entire market place. Adequate collateral usage will reduce the need for capital by 
reducing the collateral adjusted exposure to counterparty credit risk. These prudential measures help 
prevent liquidity or solvency problems at one firm from causing performance problems that impact 
other transactions and other firms. In so doing it reduces the costs of the externalities of risk-taking 
by reducing the likelihood of default on transactions and thereby reduces the market’s vulnerability 
to a freeze-up or  
(c) Orderly market rules  
This set of regulatory measures is designed to improve the efficiency and stability of the 
market place by protecting it from abuse and providing assurances —or at least helping to avoid— 
some of the disrupting type of events. 
One, strictly prohibit fraud and manipulation in financial markets. Create market surveillance 
and enforcement authorities, make violations punishable by civil and criminal penalties, and adopt 
“know they customer” and “truth in lending” type rules for dealers.  
Two, foster market day. In dangerous situations, the dealers sometime withdraw from the 
market and this has liquidity by requiring OTC derivatives dealers to act as market makers by 
maintaining binding bid and offer quotes throughout the trading the consequence of turning a 
disruption into a crisis. 
Three, employ "circuit breakers” and price limits for trading on OTC derivatives markets in 
order to protect the financial systems from disruptions and short-term volatility. These features are 
regularly used —and the practice is widely approved— on securities exchanges and futures and 
options exchanges, but are lacking in OTC markets. 
Four, encourage or promote the establishment of a clearing houses. Clearing houses are an 
effective means of improving the efficiency and stability of derivatives markets. They greatly 
reduce the credit risk and trading risk inherent in making trades and holding positions. By acting as 
the counterparty to every trade, they offer a AAA credit rating for everyone's credit exposure 
arising from derivatives positions.  
They also reduce operational risks involved with trading by providing trade confirmation 
services, and by acting as an arbitrator to settle disputes regarding trades or the settlement of trades 
without the delay and costs of court proceedings. In performing these critical services, clearing 
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houses mitigate several problems. Firstly, they reduce the number disputed trades because the trade 
is confirmed daily, and any dispute can be mediated by the clearing house acting as a third party. 
Secondly, they reduce the number of incomplete settlements, known as “fails,” because of the 
enhanced ability to economize on the payments and securities needed to make delivery. Thirdly, 
they improve market liquidity by creating a high standard for credit rating on exposure in  
the market.  
These regulations are as important as the derivatives markets they are designed to govern. 
These measures will both promote the use of these markets for risk management while discouraging 
their misuse. Markets that are deeper, more liquid and that are governed by orderly market rules are 
more efficient in their price setting activities than those characterized by disruptions and distortions. 
By establishing a more solid foundation for these markets they will help prevent or at least diminish 
their role in financial disruptions and pro-cyclical economic activities. The Chilean case is already a 
positive example of how financial market regulation can improvement a market place, and these 
additional regulatory measures will help make sure that the growth of this market is accompanied 
by improvements in the regulatory framework and positive economic results. 
11. Concluding remarks 
This report shows that derivatives markets are large and growing rapidly, and that they are playing 
an increasingly important role in the economies of Chile and Brazil. The report focuses primarily on 
Chile in exploring how that important role is in some cases positive, especially when it reduces 
exposure to foreign exchange risk, and in other cases negative. The positive role comes about from 
the use of derivatives to reduce existing risk —primarily foreign exchange risk from foreign 
borrowing, foreign investing and international trade. This reduction of risk exposure means lower 
magnitudes of economic disruption from financial crises abroad or any substantial movement in the 
exchange rate. 
The negative consequences of derivatives markets in Chile include their potential to generate 
reciprocal capital outflows and exacerbate trends in the movement of the exchange rate. The amount 
of the former can be reduced through a deepening of the market, and well targeted regulatory 
measures may prove helpful —as they have in the past— in increasing market participation from a 
variety of different economic interests and viewpoints. However the stability of these markets and 
their regulatory framework has not been tested by a financial crisis in Chile.  Moreover, some 
market participants —or some types or market activities— appear to be problematic in that they 
appear to be having a pro-cyclical impact on the market. The participation of hedge funds and some 
other financial institutions in the pursuit of certain investment strategies seems to be adding 
upwards pressure to the peso when it has undergone recent periods of appreciation. The report also 
identified certain periods when it appears that non-financial corporation were hedging in 
anticipation of a depreciation, and this selling of pesos in the forward market put further downward 
pressure on its value.  
Some of the other specific issues addressed in the report include the following. Derivatives 
may alter the hierarchy of volatility of capital flows, making long-term flows potentially more 
volatile. In 1998-99, large foreign investors, heavily hedged their external debt exposure fearing a 
peso depreciation. This contributed significantly, in a self-fulfilling, way to a depreciation. 
However, this anticipatory selling can be avoided, to a significant extent, if these large enterprises 
were required to hedge any significant foreign exchange exposure. This would have both positive 
macro-economic effects, protect the firms profitability, enhance their capacity to invest and deepen 
the Chilean derivatives market. Such well designed regulation to encourage hedging would help 
create a more balanced market in derivatives instruments and provide better hedging opportunities 
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for all sizes of firms in the economy. A more balanced market would seem to be less likely to 
generate reverse capital flows as derivatives dealers seek to balance the risks on their trading book.  
This key policy lesson is perhaps more important outside Chile (where large companies are 
already hedging their currency exposures) for example in some other Latin American countries 
where derivatives markets have yet to, or are only beginning to, develop.  
At the same time, new and possibly dangerous sources of volatility are opened by certain 
uses of derivatives. For example, the speculative use of derivatives by hedge funds and some other 
financial institutions can potentially lead to significant losses that would cause credit losses at 
derivatives dealers who make up the core of Chile’s financial sector. These investment strategies 
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Definitions and abbreviations 
Affiliate – another firm related by being either the parent or another 
subsidiary of the same parent 
Bullet bond – semi-annual or annual interest payments (called coupon 
payments) and entire principal and coupon is paid on date of 
maturity 
Collateral (also known as margin) – cash, government securities or 
other assets posted to counterparty in order to help guarantee 
full performance on the derivatives contract and thereby reduce 
counterparty credit risk  
Counterparty – the entity enters into the other side of the derivatives 
contracts and takes the opposite position 
Formal foreign exchange market – in Chile the Central Bank requires 
reporting of most foreign exchange transactions in order that 
convertibility is guaranteed 
Lay-off risk – to enter into another similar but opposite transaction in 
order to reduce the overall exposure 
LIBOR – the rate at which off-shore or Eurodollar banks are willing to 
lend (London Interbank Offered Rate) 
Long-hedge – entering into a long-position in a derivatives contract to 
hedge an already existing short position. For example, an airline 
buying heating oil futures in order to hedge their requirement to 
purchase jet fuel in order keep their planes flying 
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Offset risk – see lay-off risk 
SAFP – Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, wwww.safp.cl 
SBIF – Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras, www.sbif.cl  
Short-hedge – entering into a short-position in a derivatives contract to hedge an already existing 
long position. For example, a corn farmer hedges his crop (a long position) by selling corn 
futures 
Spread – the difference between bid and ask quotes, or the risk premium above a risk-free or other 
benchmark rate 
“Take a position” – a phrase meaning to enter into a transaction (or series of) in order to potentially 
profit from a future price movement 
UF or “Unidad de Fomento” – Chilean pesos indexed to inflation at an official CPI rate 
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